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THE CAPITAL SHAREHOLDER'S ULTIMATE
CALAMITY: PIERCED CORPORATE VEILS AND
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
MARYLAND, AND VIRGINIA
G. Michael Epperson* and Joan M, Canny"
Investors who elect to administer their investments through a corporation
rather than some other form of organization do so in the belief that a corpo-
ration will stand as a buffer between the uncertainties of the business world
and their personal assets. The use of a corporation to limit liability may be
especially important where the activities of the business venture are likely to
expose its promoters to liability in contract or in tort. But limited liability
for corporate shareholders is neither automatic nor absolute; at best, the im-
perfectly maintained corporation constitutes an imperfect shield. While
most investors acknowledge the liability risks for directors and officers,'
many are likely to be surprised at the frequency with which courts "pierce
the corporate veil" to hold shareholders personally liable for the acts and
debts of the corporation.
This Article reviews the quite different circumstances in which the courts
in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia have disregarded the
corporate entity.2 What Maryland views as only a theoretical remedy, rarely
if ever used, the District of Columbia courts use frequently in a wide variety
of cases. Virginia courts appear to steer a middle course, doling out the
remedy where necessary, but doing so with a parsimonious hand.
Part I of this Article discusses the theory underlying the doctrine of lim-
ited liability and reviews the three primary scenarios in which that doctrine
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1. This Article addresses only personal liability for shareholders, leaving the issues of
personal liability for directors and officers to be treated elsewhere.
2. The phrases "piercing the corporate veil" and "disregarding the corporate entity" are
used interchangeably in the case law and in this Article.
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may be disregarded: defective incorporation, charter revocation, and the
piercing of the corporate veil. Part II focuses on the most common of these
scenarios, the pierced corporate veil. After a comparative review of the case
law applicable to corporations organized under the laws of the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, the Article also evaluates whether the
source of liability (tort, contract, or evasion of statute) has affected the out-
come of corporate veil cases in the three jurisdictions. Finally, Part III con-
siders the counseling implications suggested by the case law for businesses
incorporated in the capital region.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Doctrine of Limited Liability
The corporation is an artificial construct created by the state to facilitate
business transactions.' It is viewed as an independent entity, separate and
distinct from its shareholders, and is endowed with attributes designed to
make it a convenient and cost-effective form in which to operate a business.4
Foremost among these corporate attributes is the express limitation of a
shareholder's liability to an amount equal to his or her capital investment.5
According to this doctrine of "limited liability," a contributor to the corpo-
ration stands to lose only the amount he or she put at risk in the corporate
venture; the debts of the corporation are its own and not those of its constit-
uent members.
The purpose of limiting shareholder liability is to encourage investment
and facilitate the accumulation of enterprise capital.6 The business incorpo-
3. A frequently quoted definition of the corporate entity was articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819):
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to
its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object
for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the
expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession
of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual.
Id. at 636.
4. See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 3-5, 287-332 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 24-40.2 (rev. perm.
ed. 1983); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 77-78 (1961).
5. See Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1351 (1948). Dodd considers limited liability to be one of the most important
legal developments contributing to the growth of American industry during the nineteenth
century. Id. at 1379. For a brief history of corporations, see McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch.
407, 415-20 (Md. 1831).
6. The classic Virginia case, Beale v. Kappa Alpha Order, 192 Va. 382, 64 S.E.2d 789
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rated solely and for the avowed purpose of limiting liability is not simply
legitimate, but reflects the desired incentives of state corporation laws.7
The success of the corporate form is reflected in the great concentration of
the nation's wealth it represents.8 From the investor's perspective, limited
liability allows for both diversification and limitation of risk; the investor
will not lose more than his or her investment should the enterprise fail. 9 For
the corporation, limited shareholder liability reduces the cost of funds to the
enterprise by making investment more attractive and, thereby, facilitates the
aggregation of large amounts of capital." These social and economic policy
(1951), emphasizes the significance of property to the Virginia corporation and its endowed
qualities:
The fundamental concept of a corporation is that it is a separate entity created under
the law to enable a group of persons to limit their liability in a joint venture to the
extent of their contributions to the capital stock. The property of the corporation is a
basis for credit extended it and those dealing with it are limited in their recovery to
the property owned and possessed by the corporation.
Id. at 395, 64 S.E.2d at 796.
7. As a Maryland court explained, "[a] commercial corporation is a legal entity con-
ceived by the mind of man and legitimated by statute for the avowed purpose of achieving a
maximum profit with a minimum exposure to liability." Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App.
644, 645, 382 A.2d 893, 894 (1978). Limited shareholder liability is consistent with the gener-
ally accepted public policy of creating and maintaining a social and economic environment
attractive to business activity.
Whether limited liability is in fact either a necessary or moral attribute of the corporation is
a subject of continuing debate, particularly in the realm of law and economics. Compare Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 89, 93-103
(1985) (economic analysis explains the legal treatment of limited liability) and Manne, Our
Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262-63 (1967) (examining
various explanations for necessity of limited liability) with Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Pierc-
ing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 352 (1979) (generally questioning
validity of limited liability doctrine) and Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for
the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1196-98 (1967) (arguing for shareholders'
liability in tort cases).
8. See Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal
Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 853, 854 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 371, 371-72
(1981).
10. Because of these perceived advantages to the corporate form, the states have codified
the existence and qualities of the corporate entity, endowing it further with "individuality," or
an existence separate from the sum of its investors, and the "capacity to hold property, to
contract, to sue and be sued, and to enjoy continued existence notwithstanding changes in its
membership." H. HENN, supra note 4, § 143. Although the corporation laws vary by jurisdic-
tion, each state typically sets forth the attributes of the corporation in that state, the types of
corporations that are recognized, and how the corporation may come into and maintain an
independent existence. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-101 to -1148 (1981 & Supp. 1987);
MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1-101 to 11-805 (1985 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.1-301 to -998 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
The perceived function of these corporation statutes and of the corporation itself is to ad-
vance business. Consequently, neither the laws nor the corporate form itself provide for the
1988]
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interests in the corporation extend to common variations on the corporate
form, namely closely held" and affiliated corporations. 2
B. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Limited Liability
The corporate attribute of limited liability fails to protect the investor pri-
marily 3 in three circumstances: (i) when the corporate veil has not been
properly established in the first instance; (ii) when the corporate charter has
been revoked by operation of state corporation law; and (iii) when the corpo-
protection of creditors, tort victims, and other parties that may interact, regularly or haphaz-
ardly, with the corporation.
11. See Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corpora-
tion Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525:
The close corporation as it is found in the market place cannot be defined precisely,
although corporations having very few stockholders all of whom are likely to be
active in the operation of the business and whose shares are subject to transfer re-
strictions have been referred to as close corporations or incorporated partnerships.
Id. at 526 n.2. The one-person, family, or other close corporation will be recognized and
accorded the benefits of the corporate form if, generally speaking, the business is conducted on
a corporate rather than a personal basis and is established and operated according to the law.
Ownership of all or nearly all of the shares by one individual or a handful of individuals will
not ordinarily call into question the corporation's legitimacy. See H. HENN, supra note 4,
§ 144.
12. The separate corporate nature of subsidiaries and other affiliated corporations is simi-
larly recognized, assuming legitimate purposes. Affiliated corporations are expected to operate
separately and to maintain the requisite corporate formalities. H. HENN, supra note 4, § 145.
13. On occasion a shareholder or shareholders will ask that the corporation be disre-
garded in order to avoid disadvantages of the corporate form. As a general rule the courts
have been unwilling to acquiesce in the use of the law in such a manner. In Schenley Distillers
Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432 (1946), for example, the United States Supreme Court
held that separate subsidiaries may not be treated as one single commercial enterprise under
control of the parent when it is convenient for their purposes to do so:
While corporate entities may be disregarded where they are made the implement for
avoiding a clear legislative purpose, they will not be disregarded where those in con-
trol have deliberately adopted the corporate form in order to secure its advantages
and where no violence to the legislative purpose is done by treating the corporate
entity as a separate legal person. One who has created a corporate arrangement,
chosen as a means of carrying out his business purposes, does not have the choice of
disregarding the corporate entity in order to avoid the obligations which the statute
lays upon it for the protection of the public.
Id. at 437; see also Terry v. Yancey, 344 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1965) (where plaintiff sought
to have corporation disregarded in order to increase damages for injuries to individual where
corporation suffered no damage, court held that "where an individual creates a corporation as
a means of carrying out his business purposes he may not ignore the existence of the corpora-
tion in order to avoid its disadvantages"); Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 863 (E.D. Va. 1980) ("[T]he officers and directors of First Management
determined that two corporations were necessary, one to own and lease the Picture Lake prop-
erty, and one to manage and operate the Trav-L-Park .... Once the decision was made,
plaintiffs were bound by the disadvantages as well as the advantages of separate
incorporation.").
[Vol. 37:605
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rate veil is "pierced" by a court to provide recourse to a tort victim, a credi-
tor, or a litigant seeking damages for breach of contract.
1. Defective Incorporation
Investors in a new enterprise have been held personally liable for acts
taken and debts incurred by the enterprise before it became a corporation.
These defective incorporation cases typically involve faulty attempts to es-
tablish a corporation, as where the filing of the articles of incorporation was
delayed for several months14 or where the organizational meeting of the in-
corporators was never held.15 Courts imposing personal liability on share-
holders commonly have grounded such liability either in agency or in an
"automatic partnership" theory, which holds that the principals of a defec-
tive corporation are partners carrying on as co-owners of a business for
profit and, therefore, are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the
partnership. 16
In the past, courts unwilling to mete out such a harsh result have invoked
either of two doctrines to clothe an investor with the corporate attribute of
limited liability. Where there has been a good faith effort to organize a cor-
poration, courts have acknowledged de facto corporations, even where orga-
nizational efforts have been flawed.1 7 Alternatively, courts have estopped
plaintiffs to deny the corporate existence where the plaintiff "has contracted
or otherwise dealt with the association in such a manner as to recognize and
in effect admit its existence as a corporate body."'"
Modem corporation statutes, in an apparent effort to eliminate problems
inherent in the de facto, de jure, and estoppel concepts, contain provisions
declaring that the corporate existence shall begin only upon issuance of the
certificate of incorporation, and that such certificate shall be conclusive evi-
dence of incorporation. In the District of Columbia, such a provision 9 has
been held dispositive of the issue:
14. See, e.g., Cranson v. IBM, 234 Md. 477, 480, 200 A.2d 33, 34 (1964); Womack v.
Stephens, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 305, 309 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1987).
15. See, e.g., Freestate Land Corp. v. Bostetler, 292 Md. 570, 574, 440 A.2d 380, 381
(1982).
16. See generally Womack, 115 Wash. L. Rep. at 309 (recognizing the automatic partner-
ship theory in other jurisdictions, but declining to adopt it in the District of Columbia).
17. The doctrine of de facto corporations has been applied where the promoters can show:
(1) the existence of a law authorizing incorporation, (2) a good faith effort to incorporate under
the existing law, and (3) the actual exercise of corporate powers. Cranson, 234 Md. at 480, 200
A.2d at 34.
18. Id. at 481, 200 A.2d at 34. The doctrine of estoppel can be invoked even where the
elements of a de facto corporation have not been met. Id. at 487, 200 A.2d at 38.
19. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-349 (1981).
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No longer must the courts inquire into the equities of a case to
determine whether there has been "colorable compliance" with the
statute. The corporation comes into existence only when the certif-
icate has been issued. Before the certificate issues, there is no cor-
poration de jure, de facto or by estoppel.2 °
Similar provisions have been enacted in Virginia 2' and in Maryland.22
2. Revocation of the Corporate Charter
Where the corporation has been formed in compliance with the state's
20. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 446 (D.C. App. 1964); accord Womack, 115 Daily
Wash. L. Rep. at 309. In Womack, the landlord leased commercial office space in September
1982 to a District of Columbia company, Capitol Technical Services Corp. (Capitol), upon the
signature of its president, Stephens. Id. at 305. Unknown to the parties, however, Capitol's
attorney failed to file the incorporation papers and the company was not actually incorporated
until May 1983. Id. Before going out of business, Capitol occupied the landlord's premises for
about a year. Id. The landlord sued to recover Capitol's unpaid rent from Capitol's stock-
holders, officers, and directors. Id.
The court awarded the landlord judgment against Hayes, who was one of Capitol's original
organizers, directors, and stockholders, but not against Cooper, who joined the company after
the lease had been executed (all other defendants had settled before trial). Id. The court
considered Hayes' early involvement in the organization, capitalization, and management of
the business, and specifically noted that Hayes had initiated contact with the landlord on Capi-
tol's behalf for the purpose of securing the lease. Id. at 309. In his capacity as a director,
Hayes also had voted to authorize Capitol's president to enter into the lease on Capitol's be-
half. Id. Under these circumstances, the court had no hesitation in finding that Hayes, with
respect to the lease obligation, had "assumed to act as the corporation." Id. Consequently, in
the absence of a certificate of incorporation, he was personally liable for all "corporate" debts
incurred by Capitol pursuant to that lease. Id.
Cooper, on the other hand, joined the company, and became a stockholder and a director
two months after the lease was signed when Capitol was already on the premises. Id. Cooper
never saw the lease, met with the landlord prior to its execution, or negotiated for the lease.
Id. Nor did he in his capacity as director authorize the execution of the lease. Id. The court
found that Cooper had never "assumed to act as a corporation" regarding the lease, and de-
nied the landlord judgment against him. Id.
Notably, the landlord nevertheless argued that Cooper should be liable on the theory that a
defective incorporation attempt results in a partnership, under which each partner would be
fully liable even for acts he did not participate in or authorize. Id. The court considered the
apparent applicability of the definition of a partnership under District of Columbia law, i.e.,
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit," and
noted that other states have adopted the "automatic partnership" theory in cases of defective
incorporation. Id. Because no District of Columbia court had adopted the theory, however,
and because the court was persuaded that such a result is both inequitable and wrong, it re-
fused to adopt the theory in the District of Columbia absent evidence that the parties intended
to establish a partnership instead of a corporation. Id.
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-621 (1981); see also Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 318 S.E.2d
292 (1984).
22. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 1-206(c) (1985 & Supp. 1987). But see Cran-
son, 234 Md. at 488-89, 200 A.2d at 38-39 (estoppel theory applied despite failure to comply
with "modern" corporate statute).
[Vol. 37:605
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corporation statute, its charter nevertheless can be revoked by operation of
law, as where the entity was organized under a statute granting a specific
maximum duration,23 or where, as in most states, the corporation statute
provides for automatic revocation of the corporate charter upon failure to
pay required taxes or to file required reports for, in most cases, two years.
24
Where the corporation continues to do business in the corporate name
after its charter has been revoked, the shareholders may be held liable for
debts incurred or acts taken after the corporate form has been withdrawn. A
Virginia court, for example, recently indicated that investors who sign a
promissory note on behalf of a corporation dissolved for failure to file annual
reports can be held personally liable on the note, even though the corpora-
tion is subsequently reinstated.25 District of Columbia courts also have im-
posed personal liability on the shareholders of a dissolved corporation. In
1979, for example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the
owner of a construction corporation personally liable for contract damages
incurred during a temporary revocation of the corporate charter for failure
to file reports.26
23. See, e.g., Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Wheeler, 93 Va. 605, 611, 25 S.E. 891,
892 (Va. 1896) (corporation formed in 1870 under corporation law which limited life of all
corporations to 20 years).
24. The corporation statutes of all three jurisdictions addressed herein contain such provi-
sions. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-399.23 (1981) (effect of failure to pay annual report fee or to
file annual report); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-503 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (forfeiture
of charter for nonpayment of taxes or failure to file report); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-752 (1985
& Supp. 1987) (automatic termination of corporate existence). In each case, the corporate
statute also provides for reinstatement of the charter upon application by the dissolved corpo-
ration. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-399.23 (1981); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-507 to -
512 (1985 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-754 (1985 & Supp. 1987). Absent such
application, the corporation, nevertheless, by operation of law remains a legal entity, in some
cases for a limited period, to liquidate assets and for the purpose of any actions or suits filed
against it. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-397 (1981); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-515
(1985 & Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-755 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
25. McLean Bank v. Nelson, 232 Va. 420, 427-28, 350 S.E.2d 651, 657-58 (1986). The
McLean court held that "[ilt is the corporate form that provides limited liability. Without the
corporation .... personal liability exists." Id. at 426, 350 S.E.2d at 656. Under the facts of
that case, it was sufficient to hold that "officers, directors, or agents can be held personally
liable for contracts entered into on behalf of the corporation," id. at 428, 350 S.E.2d at 657, but
the reasoning of the McLean decision would also apply to the shareholders of a dissolved
corporation.
26. Truitt v. Miller, 407 A.2d 1073, 1080 (D.C. 1979). The court said that reinstatement
of the corporate charter would make the corporation liable for the debt incurred during the
period of dissolution, but it would not relieve the shareholder of personal liability. Id.; see also
National Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. Bernstein, 498 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C. 1985) (charter reinstate-
ment given retroactive effect to enable dissolved corporation to be sued upon debt). Reinstate-
ment does not allow the corporation to take advantage of contracts executed during the period
of revocation. To allow the latter would "encourage a corporation to default on paying its
taxes and fees and filing its annual reports [because it could later] completely erase the effects
19881
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3. "Piercing the Corporate Veil"
When a corporation has been properly organized and, in the eyes of the
state corporation authorities, properly maintained, the only path to the in-
vestors' personal assets is through the "corporate veil."'2 7 Because to "pierce
the corporate veil" is to undermine the very purposes of the corporation,
courts addressing the issue often are caught between the conflicting goals of
preserving the corporate entity and affording relief to the victim.2" The flexi-
bility and discretionary nature of this remedy causes confusion in stating the
doctrine and in applying it in any individual case. Furthermore, the strong
policy rationales for maintaining the corporation have led courts to be reluc-
tant, inconsistent, and unclear about whether and when the corporate entity
will be disregarded.29 The doctrine has assumed very different forms even in
the three neighboring jurisdictions of the capital region.
Most courts, applying a "two-pronged test," have disregarded the corpo-
rate form only when: (1) the shareholders have not maintained the separate
identity of the corporation; and (2) the shareholders have misused the corpo-
rate form in such a way that, if the acts at issue are attributed to the corpora-
tion alone, an inequitable result will follow.3" The first prong of the test,
known by many colorful labels,3" looks for "such unity of interest and own-
of the penalty." Truitt, 407 A.2d at 1081 (quoting Accurate Constr. Co. v. Washington, 378
A.2d 681, 685 (D.C. 1977)); see also Federal Express Servs. Corp. v. American Fed'n. of Com-
munity Credit Unions, 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 97, 100 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1984) (cor-
poration where charter is revoked is not legal entity capable of receiving title to real property
and subsequent reinstatement cannot validate deed during period of revocation), aff'd, 116
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 81 (D.C. App. Ct. Jan. 14, 1988); American Elementary Elec. Co. v.
Normandy, 46 App. D.C. 329, 340-42 (1917).
27. The Article focuses on disregard of the corporate entity in order to afford the merito-
rious plaintiff access to the personal assets of shareholders. Challenges are sometimes made to
the corporate form for other purposes, however, including jurisdiction and res judicata. See
generally Comment, The Alter Ego Doctrine: Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30
UCLA L. REV. 129 (1982).
28. For a history of the piercing doctrine, see Broida, The History of the Development of
the Remedy of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 65 ILL. B. J. 522 (1977); Comment, Piercing the
Corporate Veil in Federal Courts. Is Circumvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAC. L.J. 1245,
1250-51 (1982).
29. Compare Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 979 (1971) ("A sys-
tematic analysis ... is not readily discernible in the cases, and many courts continue to rely on
metaphors to explain their results.") with Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited
Liability Protection, 45 N.D. L. REV. 363, 380 (1969) ("The doctrine's continued vitality de-
pends upon the very imprecision which might cause some legal critics to denounce it.").
30. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 9, at 376.
31. Courts employ a variety of terms for this concept, including: "mere adjunct,"
"agent," "alter ego," "arm," "blind," "branch," "hugger cloak," "coat," "corporate double,"
"cover," "creative," "curious reminiscence," "delusion," "department," "dry shell,"
"dummy," "fiction," "form," "formality," "fraud on the law," "instrumentality," "mouth-
piece," "name," "nominal identity," "phrase," "puppet," "screen," "sham," "simulacrum,"
[Vol. 37:605
Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calamity
ership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual
no longer exist."32 This "mere instrumentality" test is often met where there
has been a failure to observe formalities and to maintain the proper "corpo-
rate housekeeping."33 The second prong of the test typically is met where a
court finds fraud, undercapitalization, or bad faith on the part of sharehold-
ers.3 4 In theory, the doctrine of limited liability extends with equal force to
all variations on the corporate form. 35 In practice, however, the preponder-
ance of corporate veils which have been pierced have been those of closely
held or subsidiary corporations.36
"snare," "subterfuge," and "tool." See E. LArrY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIA-
TIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 42 (1951). Justice Cardozo, in Berkley v. Third Ave. Ry., 244
N.Y. 84, 89, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), addressed the problem of the metaphors frequently used
in these cases:
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the corporate entity will
be ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary
which is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well enough if the
picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential term to be
defined is the act of operation.
Id., 155 N.E. at 61.
32. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
33. Barber, supra note 9, at 371.
34. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 27, at 137-38 (asserting that in every case in which
courts have imposed shareholder liability, the shareholders arguably acted in bad faith). Un-
dercapitalization is gaining strength in several jurisdictions, notably California, as grounds for
disregarding the corporate form. See Barber, supra note 9, at 386-402; Gelb, Piercing the Cor-
porate Veil-The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1982).
35. As a general rule, the law does not regard the parent-subsidiary relation as suspect,
but rather presumes that the corporate entities are formally and functionally independent, and
that each deserves the protections to which such corporations are legally entitled. Where,
however, the parent so dominates or controls the subsidiary that the latter is a "mere instru-
mentality" of the parent, courts have pierced the subsidiary's veil to hold the controlling cor-
poration responsible for its weaker affiliate's wrongdoing. As with the affiliated corporation,
the general presumption for the one-person, family, or other closely held corporation is that it
is an independent corporate entity apart from its shareholders or officers. Limited liability is
enjoyed by a controlling shareholder where corporate formalities are observed, financing is
adequate, and there is no evidence of fraud. See H. HENN, supra note 4, § 146. As one com-
mentator has remarked, "[dlomination as such is not evidence of any impropriety which
should contribute to a decision to pierce the corporate veil ... far from discouraging domina-
tion of corporations by one person there are corporation statutes which expressly contemplate
such a situation." Gelb, supra note 34, at 8-9. On the other hand, creditors dealing with close
corporations are apt to require personal guarantees, thereby increasing the shareholders' liabil-
ity without requiring the courts to look behind the corporate form. Id. at 9-10. Even so, in
cases where there is a "unity of interests" between a corporation and its shareholders, and the
latter attempts to use the corporate form for an improper or fraudulent purpose, a close corpo-
ration's veil can be pierced to afford a remedy to the victim of such conduct.
36. Henn states that the "principles for disregarding the corporation apply whether the
corporation has one shareholder or many." H. HENN, supra note 4, § 143. Henn notes, how-
ever, that "the rule that corporateness will be sustained only so long as it is used for legitimate
1988]
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Of the three primary exceptions to the doctrine of limited liability, share-
holder liability most frequently results from attempts to pierce the corporate
veil, and it is this third exception that is the focus of this Article.
II. DIVERGING APPROACHES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
MARYLAND, AND VIRGINIA
Although most courts, in deciding challenges to the corporate veil, pay
homage to the traditional two-prong test, courts in different states have ap-
plied the test in such a manner as to develop widely divergent and sometimes
contradictory standards across even neighboring jurisdictions. It must be
emphasized at the outset, moreover, that this is an area of law where courts
adopt differing approaches even within jurisdictions. Although the follow-
ing discussion purports to discern patterns in the decisional law, generaliza-
tions about the law of any jurisdiction are advanced merely for purposes of
comparison, and not as reliable restatements of coherent case law. Subject
to those caveats, however, the following discussion dramatically demon-
strates the differing standards for determining shareholder liability which,
depending on their state of incorporation, may apply to corporations doing
business in the capital region.
37
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil in the District of Columbia
Of the three neighboring jurisdictions, the District of Columbia has been
the most obliging to plaintiffs seeking to disregard the corporate form.
While paying lip service to the traditional two-prong test,38 it can be argued
that District of Columbia courts regard transacting business in a corporate
purposes has special significance when applied to the one-man, family or other close corpora-
tion." Id. § 144. The scrutiny given close and affiliated corporations stems from their use of
corporate formalities to obtain seemingly disproportionate benefits to their obligations and
their level of business activity. The individual can incorporate and create a fiction whereby his
personal assets are separated and protected from the liabilities engendered by his business
activities; a parent corporation may seal off a new or risky venture in a subsidiary, preventing
the liabilities incurred by such activity from inducing the hemorrhage of the parent corpora-
tion. Id. § 145.
37. For a discussion of choice of law issues, see infra text accompanying notes 186-92.
38. In Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984), for example, the court reported that
"[t]hroughout the years this court has held that the acts and obligations of the corporate entity
will not be recognized as those of a particular person until the party seeking to disregard the
corporate entity has proved by affirmative evidence that there is (1) unity of ownership and
interest, and (2) use of the corporate form to perpetrate fraud or wrong." Id. at 815; see also
McAuliffe v. C & K Builders, 142 A.2d 605, 607 (D.C. 1958); Burrows Motor Co. v. Davis, 76
A.2d 163, 165 (D.C. 1950). Two cases involving an attempt to pierce the corporate veil in a
bankruptcy context are In re Washington Medical Center, 10 Bankr. 616 (D.C. 1981) and In
re 1438 Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 15 Bankr. 89 (D.C. 1981).
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form as a privilege conferred on a deserving few. In the District of Colum-
bia, unlike in Maryland or Virginia, a disregard of corporate formalities,
without more, may constitute prima facie evidence of unfairness or inequity.
Only in the District of Columbia has the corporate form been disregarded
solely on the grounds that it was formed to avoid personal liability.
1. The Labadie Coal Case: Merging the Two-prong Test
Any consideration of the doctrine in the District of Columbia should be-
gin with the federal appellate court decision in Labadie Coal Co. v. Black 39
In Labadie, a coal broker named Black had allegedly purchased hundreds of
thousands of dollars worth of coal on credit from the plaintiff, resold it, and
then failed to pay the plaintiff.' The district court had dismissed plaintiff's
action seeking to hold Black personally liable for money owed by Black's
family-owned corporation, FAI Trading, Ltd. (FAI).41 The court of appeals
reversed on the ground that the trial court had inadequately considered
whether unfairness would result if the corporate veil was not pierced.4 2 The
Labadie court articulated the considerations which it thought deserved em-
phasis on remand, and in doing so provided an unusually detailed picture of
the analysis by which the corporate entity may be disregarded in the District
of Columbia.
In line with the two-prong test, the Labadie court instructed the district
court to examine first the "formalities," and second, "the element of unfair-
ness."43 Beginning with "the nature of the corporate ownership and con-
trol," '" the court of appeals reviewed six types of formalities which would
indicate the separateness or unity of the corporation and its shareholders.
The essence of the inquiry was "whether the corporation, rather than being a
distinct, responsible entity, is in fact the alter ego or business conduit of the
person in control. , 45 Accordingly, the district court was instructed to evalu-
ate the defendant's failure to maintain corporate minutes or adequate corpo-
rate records:
If FAI has been viewed as a separate and distinct entity, one would
expect appropriate records to be kept. If it is merely a separately-
named business conduit for defendant's own activities, a "d/b/a"
39. 672 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
and cases cited therein.
40. Labadie, 672 F.2d at 95 n.15.
41. While FAI was incorporated under the laws of Virginia, the Labadie court did not
address the choice-of-law issue. Id. at 93.
42. Id. at 100.
43. Id. at 96-100.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
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in all practicality, such records would not be as important and
would not be carefully maintained.46
The court noted that defendant's failure to produce corporate records was
compounded by the lack of "evidence that FAI's directors, whoever they
are, have ever played a meaningful role in FAI's activities, or have even
formally held a meeting."'4 7 Under these circumstances, it appeared that
Black alone controlled FAI and made all necessary decisions.48
The court of appeals then turned to FA's failure to maintain the formali-
ties necessary for issuance or subscription to stock, citing the absence of any
"formal approval of the stock issue by an independent board of directors."49
Black had produced for FAI only a "stock book" of blank certificates and
stubs from which the certificates had been removed, which indicated that
130 shares had been issued to his wife and three children. Apparently, how-
ever, the certificates themselves did not exist, nor did minutes or resolutions
authorizing the issuance of stock. Moreover, the certificate stubs did not
reflect the stockholdings by his wife and children that Black had described to
the court. The court, troubled by what it considered an excessive disregard
for corporate formalities, even for a closely held corporation,50 indicated
that the absence of stock subscription formalities should be considered by
the lower court "in determining whether the corporation exists beyond the
'Ltd.' in FAI's name."
5 1
The Labadie court next suggested that the commingling of Black's per-
sonal funds and the assets of the corporation, as evidenced by the checks and
financial records of Black and FAI, would suggest a failure to treat the cor-
poration as a separate and distinct entity.52 The court noted that the sepa-
rateness of the corporation and its shareholders would be undermined by the
use of corporate funds to cover unrelated personal or business expenses, or
by the "disproportion between the salaries paid and the services actually
rendered to the corporation., 5 3 Similarly, the court warned that the use of
the same office location by both the corporation and its shareholders illus-
trated the precise relationship between Black and FA. 54
Turning from its analysis of the formalities to the element of unfairness,
the Labadie court indicated that the unfairness test might be satisfied on







53. Id. at 99.
54. Id.
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remand if the lower court determined that Black had "adequately failed to
capitalize the corporation for the reasonable risks of the undertaking."5 5
The court further reasoned:
[Undercapitalization] is only a single example of how the "unfair-
ness" prong of the piercing test may be satisfied in this case, de-
pending on the eventual findings on remand. There may be others.
The "errant"party need not have willfully wronged the other party,
nor need he have engaged in anything amounting to fraud in their
relationship. The essence of the fairness test is simply that an indi-
vidual businessman cannot hide from the normal consequences of
carefree entrepreneuring by doing so through a corporate shell.56
The Labadie court thus expanded the idea of unfairness beyond fraud and
beyond injustice to encompass mere carelessness or callousness in business
behavior.
Perhaps more importantly, the Labadie decision reflects the inclination of
the District of Columbia courts to merge the two prongs of the traditional
analysis and to find the unfairness element satisfied by a finding of a unity of
interest between the corporation and its shareholders. Thus, a consideration
such as undercapitalization, ordinarily considered an indicia of the corporate
formalities or "instrumentality" requirement, was transposed in Labadie to
represent unfairness as well. Indeed, the court in Labadie suggested that
"[m]any of the factors listed in the formalities section of this discussion
should ... be considered in the court's evaluation" of unfairness.-"
2. A Pox on Carefree Entrepreneuring
The Labadie decision can be viewed as one manifestation of the flexibility
demonstrated by District of Columbia courts in finding that the "unfairness"
test has been met. That flexibility was again brought to bear in Vuitch v.
Furr,5 s a medical malpractice action against a physician, his wife, and the
incorporated clinic and hospital owned by them. The plaintiff, Furr,
brought suit for injuries she suffered from a second trimester abortion and
post-operative treatment performed by Dr. Vuitch at the Laurel Clinic. Af-
55. The court noted that "[i]t is far from clear in the present case that the initial $5,000
investment in FAI, made over four years ago, and followed by several years of failure of corpo-
ration profit, remains an adequate capitalization of even this corporation." Id. The court
pointed out, however, that whether capitalization is adequate is a "function of the type of
business in which the corporation engages." Id. Moreover, many commentators assert that
undercapitalization is an inappropriate consideration in contract cases, where the person deal-
ing with the corporation is expected to have had the opportunity to investigate. Id. at 100.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984).
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ter trial, the jury awarded Furr $125,000.00 in compensatory damages and,
in answers to special interrogatories, found that the corporate veils of the
Laurel Clinic and Laurel Hospital should be pierced. 9
On appeal, the court found the evidence sufficient to demonstrate both a
unity of interest of the corporation and shareholders, and a misuse of the
corporate form. The court noted that the Laurel clinic was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Laurel Hospital, which was, in turn, wholly owned by the
Vuitchs.6° The Vuitchs and their son were directors of and held all of the
same offices in both corporations, although the court's opinion suggested
their elections as directors and officers were made through action-by-writ-
ten-consent resolutions.61 After a detailed review of the Vuitchs' intermin-
gling of the affairs of both corporations for their personal purposes over a
period of years,6 2 the court concluded that evidence of the intermingling of
both the identities and the property of the two corporations and the disre-
gard for some corporate formalities supported the finding that the two cor-
porations failed to maintain separate identities. The court further stated that
the medical facilities served as the Vuitchs' alter ego for the purpose of per-
sonal gain.6 3
The court disagreed with the Vuitchs' argument that Furr had failed to
show that any unfairness or injustice would result from upholding the corpo-
rate form. By his own admission, Vuitch had kept Furr, after serious com-
plications arose, overnight at the clinic in knowing violation of a District of
Columbia licensing law which required that clinic patients with complica-
59. Id. at 814-15.
60. Id. at 817.
61. Id. at 817 & n.10.
62. Id. at 817. The court analyzed the intermingling of affairs in the following manner:
Laurel Hospital was incorporated, obtained a certificate to do business in the District
of Columbia, and opened a clinic at 1712 Eye Street, N.W. in 1969. Thereafter, in
1973, the Vuitchs separately incorporated the Eye Street Clinic as Laurel Clinic, Inc.
under District of Columbia law, and Laurel Hospital has existed only on paper since
then. The corporate offices for the Hospital and Clinic are, and always have been,
Dr. Vuitch's residence at 1225 Edgevale Road, Silver Spring, Maryland (the Annex),
which Dr. and Mrs. Vuitch jointly own. For several years all Clinic bills were paid
by Laurel Hospital, and the Clinic's employees were and are covered by the Hospi-
tal's Pension and Trust Plan. Laurel Hospital and Laurel Clinic file a consolidated
tax return. Dr. Vuitch uses a Laurel Hospital car to transport patients from the
Clinic to the Annex, which he uses to treat Clinic patients overnight. Yet the Annex,
which is not licensed in Maryland to treat patients, is both Dr. Vuitch's personal
residence and the business office of Laurel Hospital. Mrs. Vuitch pays all bills for the
upkeep of the Edgevale Road property from "Dr. Vuitch's accounts."
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
63. Id. at 817 (emphasis added) (citing Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d
162, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981)).
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tions be transferred to a hospital for overnight treatment.' The court thus
refused to "allow the interposition of a corporation to defeat a legislative
policy."1
65
Perhaps more surprising was the court's refusal to accept the Vuitchs'
argument that absent a showing that the corporations were unable to pay the
judgment against them, there was simply no unfairness to Furr which would
justify disregarding the corporate form. 6 6 That argument derived from the
so-called exhaustion rule, which is based on the concern that, absent a rule
requiring a court to find a subsidiary corporation incapable of satisfying a
judgment against it, the stockholders of its parent corporation could be
joined at the outset of every case against a subsidiary and forced to go
through trial even though the subsidiary might be financially capable of sat-
isfying the judgment. Without discussion, the Vuitch court sidestepped the
exhaustion rule, declaring it inapplicable in the case before it, because the
corporations were closely held.67 Moreover, the court reasoned:
We are persuaded that because the privilege of transacting business
in a corporate form granted by the legislature has been used con-
trary to law, and because the separate incorporation of the clinic
appears to be consistent only with establishing a double layer of
insulation for Laurel Hospital and Dr. and Mrs. Vuitch, the total
organization should not be allowed to be artificially subdivided for
the sole purpose of limiting liability. 61
The Vuitch decision reveals the District of Columbia courts' healthy sus-
picion of using the corporate form to limit shareholder liability, especially in
the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship where the parent is closely
held. Given an intermingling of personal and business assets, as well as an
intermingling of the assets of the two corporations, the Vuitch court held
that the first prong of the test could be satisfied by the absence of "some"
corporate formalities, even though other formalities had been respected.6 9
The second prong, that of unfairness, was satisfied either by the use of the
corporate form to evade District of Columbia law, or by the Vuitchs' at-
tempt to establish for themselves a "double layer" of limited liability.7 °
This suggestion in Vuitch, that the unfairness element of the two-pronged
64. Id. at 817-19.
65. Id. at 819 (citing Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944)).
66. Id.
67. The court found "no reason to force appellee to expend further time, effort and ex-
pense in attorney fees and court time; appellants can remedy any inequities between themselves
when they determine how the judgment shall be paid." Id. at 819-20.
68. Id. 820 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 817.
70. Id. at 820.
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test would itself be satisfied by the conclusion that the corporation was
formed solely to limit liability, had been foreshadowed by the decision in
Harris v. Wagshal. 71 Georgetown Chateaux, Inc. owned property which was
subject to Wagshal's deed of trust. Wagshal foreclosed on the property and
secured a deficiency judgment against the corporation. Finding that
Chateaux was insolvent, Wagshal sued to hold Mrs. Harris, its sole share-
holder, personally liable alleging that Chateaux was a sham corporation. In
upholding the trial court's decision to disregard the corporate form of
Chateaux, the court in Wagshal appeared to rely solely on its determination
that the corporation was the alter ego of Harris and her husband:
We recognize that formation of a corporation in order to avoid
personal liability is not itself, standing alone, an abuse of the corpo-
rate form. Here, however, we have evidence supporting a number
of findings, viz., that the corporation was formed to protect the
Harrises' business from the claims of Mr. Harris' judgment credi-
tors (a fact providing some evidence of fraudulent use of the corpo-
ration and of its use as a personal instrumentality), that Mrs.
Harris extensively commingled corporate with personal funds, and
that the formalities of the corporate form were in large part disre-
garded. Taken together, the findings support the conclusion that
the corporation had no independent existence, but was used as the
personal instrumentality of the Harrises.72
The court went on to reject the Harrises' contention that the plaintiff must
prove fraud directly tainting the obligation sued upon for the court to pierce
the corporate veil. 71 Citing the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Francis 0. Day Co. v. Shapiro,74
the court noted that "it is not always necessary to allege fraud; other consid-
erations of equity and justice can justify piercing the corporate veil.",75 In
Francis 0. Day, an action to recover an unpaid judgment for breach of con-
tract, defendant Shapiro had owned and operated several corporations from
his place of business. The court pierced the corporate veil, finding Shapiro
had used the corporate form to evade liability on the contract. In so hold-
ing, the court concluded that equitable considerations and plain justice may
lead a court to pierce the corporate veil in some cases even in the absence of
fraud. The court noted that this is especially true of those situations involv-
ing "one-man" or family corporations.7 6
71. 343 A.2d 283 (D.C. 1975).
72. Id. at 287.
73. Id.
74. 267 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
75. Wagshal, 343 A.2d at 288.
76. Francis 0. Day, 267 F.2d at 673 n.l1.
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B. Piercing the Corporate Veil in Maryland
At the other end of the spectrum from the District of Columbia courts,
Maryland courts accord the corporate entity an extraordinary measure of
deference, apparently relaxed only in instances of proven common law fraud.
The rule in Maryland is that the corporate form "will be disregarded only
when necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity." 7 7 In
practice, however, the courts simply have not found an equitable interest
more important than the state's interest in limited shareholder liability.7"
1. A Bright-Line Test
The Maryland cases suggest that neither an utter disregard for corporate
formalities nor the use of the corporate form by an individual as a shield
from liability will lead to piercing the corporate veil unless accompanied by
actual common law fraud. This bright-line test, which Maryland courts con-
sistently have followed in recent years,79 imposes a substantially more rigor-
ous standard for meeting the second prong than the amorphous "unfairness"
test applied in the District of Columbia and in Virginia. Consequently, in
applying the ostensibly equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil,
Maryland courts admit little of the discretion invoked by the courts of the
neighboring jurisdictions.
In Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc.,8 ° for example, general
contractor Ames-Ennis, Inc., after contracting to construct three public
buildings in Baltimore, subcontracted with Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. (Ar-
conti) for the performance of the masonry and related work on each of the
projects."' When a contract dispute between Ames-Ennis, Inc. and Arconti
resulted in protracted litigation, the Board of Directors of Bart Arconti &
Sons resolved that the company would cease to operate until the litigation
77. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 654, 382 A.2d 893, 899 (1978).
78. Refusing to pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary of a savings and loan association
in Starfish Condominium v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1983), the
court stated:
The fundamental difficulty with the trial court's analysis of the liability of S & L is
that there is no finding of fraud nor is there identification of an equity which requires
enforcement, and which is paramount to the ordinary expectation of limited liability
on the part of the shareholder of Service Co.
Id. at 714, 458 A.2d at 816; see also Carozza v. Federal Fin. & Credit Co., 131 A. 332, 338
(Md. App. 1925) (referring to a "paramount and superior equity").
79. For three older Maryland cases, see Crocker v. Pitti, 179 Md. 52, 56, 16 A.2d 875, 877
(1940); William Danzer & Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 164 Md. 448, 457, 165 A. 463, 467 (1933);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 82, 118 A. 279, 284 (1922).
80. 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975).
81. Id. at 297, 340 A.2d at 227.
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with Ames-Ennis was resolved.8 2 Prior to the litigation, Arconti had been
the most prominent of three corporations owned by Bart and George Ar-
conti.13 While Arconti lay dormant, the other two corporations, which op-
erated at the same place of business and employed the same workmen, used
Arconti's equipment and assets without compensation. 4
The trial court found the purpose of these activities had been to "evade
legal obligations devolving upon (Arconti] during the pendency of the pres-
ent action," and resulted in rendering Arconti all but insolvent.8 5 In the
view of the trial court, Bart and George, as the dominant directors and sole
shareholders of all three corporations, had directed their corporate opera-
tions for the sole purpose of keeping Arconti's subcontracting business while
rendering that corporation insolvent through the shifting of assets and busi-
ness to the other corporations.8 6 The trial court found that these actions
justified piercing the corporate veil.
8 7
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed stating that it was unaware of
any Maryland case where the court had disregarded the corporate entity,
absent evidence of fraud or similar conduct, merely to prevent the evasion
of legal obligations.8 8 In so holding, the court of appeals rejected the analy-
sis advanced by Herbert Brune in his frequently cited treatise, Maryland
Corporate Law and Practice,9 which was relied upon by the lower
82. Id. at 304, 340 A.2d at 231.
83. Id., 340 A.2d at 231.
84. Id. at 304-05, 340 A.2d at 231. These activities also included loans to Bart and
George Arconti from Arconti, and the transfer of insurance policies on Bart and George Ar-
conti to them from the corporation. Id. at 305, 340 A.2d at 231.
85. Id., 340 A.2d at 231.
86. Id., 340 A.2d at 231.
87. Id., 340 A.2d at 231.
88. Id. at 311-12, 340 A.2d at 235.
89. Id. at 309-11, 340 A.2d at 234-35. Brune advances three occasions in which the
courts under Maryland law will pierce the corporate veil:
The general rule is that the corporation will be regarded as an independent person,
distinct from its shareholders and having rights not limited by disabilities or liabili-
ties which would be imposed on its shareholders; and, conversely, that the sharehold-
ers are not liable for the debts or obligations of the corporation. This rule is subject
to exception when necessary to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity; and a
number of cases have arisen which set a pattern as to the circumstances under which
the corporate entity will be disregarded.
First. Where the corporation is used as a mere shield for the perpetration of a
fraud, the courts will disregard the fiction of separate corporate entity.
Second. The courts may consider a corporation as unencumbered by the fiction of
corporate entity and deal with substance rather than form as though the corporation
did not exist, in order to prevent evasion of legal obligations.
Third. Where the stockholders themselves, or a parent corporation owning the
stock of a subsidiary corporation, fail to observe the corporate entity, operating the
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court.90 The court stated Brune's grounds for piercing under Maryland law
had an "appealing quality about them, but ... [found] no authoritative sup-
port permitting their applicability to the facts" before it.91 Instead, reaffirm-
ing the narrow nature of the inquiry in Maryland, the court announced that
"[tihe common thread running through the Maryland cases... is that the
corporate entity will be disregarded only when necessary to prevent fraud or
to enforce a paramount equity. '"92
In Dixon v. Process Corporation, 93 two investors, Dixon and Litty, sued to
pierce the veil of the Process Corporation (Process), one of eleven wholly
owned subsidiaries of Process Incorporated of Maryland (PIM), against
whom Dixon and Litty had obtained judgments. Dixon and Litty had
purchased a tract of land to be developed by Process, entering into a con-
tract whereby PIM was to repurchase the tract within one year. 94 When the
repurchase never materialized, and PIM lacked the assets to satisfy the judg-
ments obtained against it, Dixon and Litty argued that the separate corpo-
rate identities of PIM and Process should be disregarded, claiming that
Process and PIM were simply the alter ego of Garland, president of both. 95
Dixon and Litty argued that Garland's domination of both corporations for
his personal ends, without maintaining a separate identity for each corpora-
tion, should expose Process to liability in equity for the actions of PIM.96
After reviewing the nearly complete absence of corporate housekeeping, 97
the court explicitly found that there was "legally sufficient evidence to cast
business or dealing with the corporation's property as if it were their own, the courts
will also disregard the corporate entity for the protection of third persons.
H. BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 371 (rev. ed. 1953) (footnotes
omitted).
90. For other Maryland cases citing H. BRUNE, see Rosenbloom v. Electric Motor Repair
Co., 31 Md. App. 711, 720, 358 A.2d 617, 623 (1976); Maryland Trust Co. v. Tulip Realty
Co., 120 Md. 399, 414, 153 A.2d 275, 284 (1959).
91. Arconti, 275 Md. at 312, 340 A.2d at 235.
92. Id., 340 A.2d at 235.
93. 38 Md. App. 644, 382 A.2d 893 (1978).
94. Id. at 648, 382 A.2d at 896.
95. Id. at 651, 382 A.2d at 897-98.
96. Id., 382 A.2d at 898.
97. Id. at 647, 382 A.2d at 895. The court concluded that:
Garland, the president and a director of both PIM and [Process], testified that the
directors for both corporations were the same, the stock of PIM was paid for but not
issued, PIM owned all the equipment used by its subsidiaries, hired their employees,
rented their offices, operated their payrolls and unemployment matters, and managed
their affairs. At meetings of the boards of directors, inferentially of PIM, the busi-
ness matters of the various corporations were discussed. Separate board meetings
were not held.
Id. at 654, 382 A.2d at 899. However, the court noted that the stock was not issued "because
of the neglect of the secretary" and that articles of incorporation for both PIM and Process
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doubt as to the separate corporate identities of PIM and Process."98 The
court nonetheless found such flaunting of corporate formalities insufficient
grounds for piercing the corporate veil and refused to disregard the separate
corporate entities, 99 noting that the lower court "expressly found that there
was no fraud and that no paramount equity was present in the case sub
judice which required the intervention of equity's awesome powers."' 1° Cit-
ing its earlier decision in Bart Arconti, tO' the Dixon court concluded in
strong language that "we make clear that the rule of law in this state is that
no matter how flimsily woven is the corporate curtain, it may not be flung
aside except to prevent fraud or enforce a paramount equity."'
' 0 2
2. Focus on Common Law Fraud
In Colandrea v. Colandrea, 103 the court did pierce the corporate veil, but
only upon proof of actual fraud. " In Colandrea, Dominic and Carmen
Colandrea, husband and wife, incorporated Cortland Realty Ltd. When the
couple divorced, a stock redemption agreement was executed whereby Mr.
Colandrea sold to Cortland Realty all of his stock in the corporation for
$100,000, to be paid by Cortland Realty through seven promissory notes.'° 5
Mrs. Colandrea remained as the sole shareholder, director, and president.' 0 6
Quickly following the redemption agreement, Mrs. Colandrea incorpo-
rated Cortland Ltd., which then assumed Cortland Realty's assets and oper-
ations, but none of its liabilities. Cortland Realty's name was changed to
Carmen Management Co., which existed without assets until annulled by the
had been filed with the state, a uniform set of bylaws was adopted, and minutes kept. Id. at
647, 382 A.2d at 895.
98. Id. at 654, 382 A.2d at 899.
99. Id. at 655, 382 A.2d at 900.
100. Id., 382 A.2d at 900.
101. Bart Arconti & Sons, Inc. v. Ames-Ennis, Inc., 275 Md. 295, 340 A.2d 225 (1975).
102. Dixon, 38 Md. App. at 656, 382 A.2d at 900.
103. 42 Md. App. 421, 401 A.2d 480 (1979).
104. Id. at 433, 401 A.2d at 487. Maryland courts appear to construe the fraud require-
ment more strictly than in most states, where it is given an interpretation closer to "unfair-
ness" or "inequity":
Other cases suggest that, even when both prongs of the test are met, the corporate
veil should be pierced only on a "showing of actual fraud." The use of the term
fraud, however, probably should not be interpreted in its full legal sense. The cases
indicate that this additional prong is satisfied if there is evidence of fraud, intent to
defraud, bad faith, or a showing that injustice may result if the veil is not pierced.
This actually is nothing more than satisfaction of the "unfairness" prong of the test.
Barber, supra note 9, at 377 (footnotes omitted).
105. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. at 422-23, 401 A.2d at 482.
106. Id. at 424, 401 A.2d at 483.
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state.'1 7 The seven promissory notes held by Mr. Colandrea were never
honored.' °8 As the appeals court concluded, "[t]he effect of all these corpo-
rate machinations is obvious. By [them] Mrs. Colandrea was able to con-
tinue the profitable business of Cortland Realty, Ltd. without its attendant
obligations to Mr. Colandrea."' 0 9
In order to establish fraud, however, the court required that the elements
of fraud be demonstrated by Mr. Colandrea with "clear and convincing
proof."' " In her deposition, Mrs. Colandrea had admitted that at the time
she executed the stock redemption agreement for the corporation, she never
intended to repay the notes."' The court accordingly pierced the corporate
veil and imposed liability on Mrs. Colandrea." 2
3. A Herculean Task
Maryland courts are explicit in their encouragement of the corporation as
a liability shield," 3 protecting even the "flimsily woven" corporation and
denying relief absent actual fraud on victims of corporate activities. Nor do
107. Id. at 423-24, 401 A.2d at 482-83.
108. Id. at 423, 401 A.2d at 482.
109. Id. at 425, 401 A.2d at 483.
110. Id. at 428, 401 A.2d at 484. To prove fraud, the court required Mr. Colandrea to
show five elements:
(1) a material representation of a party was false, (2) falsity was known to that party
or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to the truth as to
impute knowledge to him, (3) the misrepresentation was made with the purpose to
defraud (scienter), (4) the person justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, and
(5) the person suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresentation.
Id., 401 A.2d at 484.
111. Id. at 430, 401 A.2d at 485-86.
112. Id. at 433, 401 A.2d at 487. "Mrs. Colandrea cannot now hide behind the facades of
the corporations which she has created. The principles enunciated by the court of appeals in
Crocker v. Pitti are fully applicable to Mrs. Colandrea's attempt to avoid the obligations con-
tained in the stock redemption agreement and promissory notes." Id., 401 A.2d at 487 (cita-
tion omitted).
113. See, e.g., Antigua Condominium Ass'n v. Melba Investors Atlantic, Inc., 65 Md. App.
726, 501 A.2d 1359 (suit by condominium unit owners against developer of condominium and
its parent for breach of contract and breach of warranties), vacated, 307 Md. 700, 517 A.2d 75
(1986):
It may well be true that Bankers Trust placed the corporate body of Melba between
itself and any liability arising from the operation of Antigua Condominium. It is
apparently true that Melba acted under the control and direction of Bankers Trust.
None of this is impermissible, however. It is for the very purpose of limiting liability
that corporations are created in the first place. Moreover, it is common for one cor-
poration to distance itself from potential liability arising from various transactions by
creating and directing another corporation to manage them. The pleadings in the
instant case show no more than an arrangement which is common-place and ac-
cepted in the commercial world.
Id. at 734-35, 501 A.2d at 1364.
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Maryland courts consider closely held or affiliated corporations as suspect,
or as sham attempts to limit liability. These forms apparently receive no
greater scrutiny, even when corporate formalities have been disregarded." 4
In particular, Maryland departs from its neighboring jurisdictions in the
high level of protection afforded the parent-subsidiary relationship. In
Dixon, for example, where the parent corporation had set up no fewer than
eleven subsidiaries, and had flouted corporate formalities, the court stated:
A commercial corporation is a legal entity conceived by the mind
of man and legitimated by statute for the avowed purpose of
achieving a maximum profit with a minimum exposure to liability.
When such an entity is the parent of multiple offspring in the form
of subsidiary corporations, woe unto the creditor who seeks to rip
away the corporate facade in order to recover from one sibling of
the corporate family what is due from another in the belief that the
relationship is inseparable, if not insufferable, for his is a herculean
task."' 5
C Piercing the Corporate Veil in Virginia
Virginia courts, in deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity,
have commonly resorted to a more fluid analysis which endeavors to take
into account the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding a case.'16 In
recent cases, Virginia courts consistently have relied on the Fourth Circuit's
review of a South Carolina decision in DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray
Flemming Fruit Co., "7 in which the court of appeals, after a federal com-
114. Maryland's close corporation statute, MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 4 (1985),
presumably was intended to facilitate and encourage the development of close corporations.
See Bradley, supra note 11, at 554 ("In general, its directness, economy, and lucidity of style,
as well as its substantive coherence, stamp the Maryland statute as the best close corporation
statute to date."); see also Gillespie, supra note 29, at 375-78.
115. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 645-46, 382 A.2d 893, 894-95 (1978) (foot-
note omitted).
116. Virginia courts frequently begin their analysis by quoting Beale v. Kappa Alpha Or-
der, 192 Va. 382, 64 S.E.2d 789 (1951), where the court stated:
Just when a corporation will be regarded as the adjunct, creature, instrumentality,
device, stooge, or dummy of another corporation is usually held to be a question of
fact in each case ... and [the] courts will disregard the separate legal entities of the
corporation only when one is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrongs, pro-
tect fraud or crime of the other.
Id. at 399, 64 S.E.2d at 798 (quoting State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945).
117. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). In DeWitt, a corporation engaged as an agent for fruit
growers was disregarded and the company president was held personally liable. Id. The De-
Witt court reviewed the "totality of the circumstances," including the following factors:
"Whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized for the purposes of the corporate un-
dertaking"-particularly in the case of one-man or closely held corporations; failure to observe
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mon law analysis, held that disregard of the corporate entity was justified
where there was a complete disregard of corporate formalities in the opera-
tion of the corporation (which functioned only for the financial advantage of
its president), 1 8 where the corporation was undercapitalized,' 9 where the
president withdrew funds from the corporation which he had collected as
due the plaintiff (a creditor),12 ° and where the president had stated to the
plaintiff that he would take care of payment of plaintiff's charges if the cor-
poration failed to do so. 2 ' While in DeWitt the Fourth Circuit reviewed
precedent from many jurisdictions, Virginia cases subsequent to DeWitt'2 2
have cited that decision for at least two important propositions: (1) that
"proof of plain fraud is not a necessary element in a finding to disregard the
corporate entity; '  and (2) that "[t]he conclusion to disregard the corpo-
rate entity may not ... rest on a single factor... but must involve a number
of such factors."'
' 24
1. West v. Costen
The 1983 federal court decision in West v. Costen 125 exemplifies the De-
Witt Trucking approach. Costen involved a class action of consumers
brought against a debt collector under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA), which had been enacted "to protect consumers from a host
of unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices without impos-
ing unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors.' 126 The plaintiffs all
owed or previously owed debts, which the primary defendant, Multi Service
Factors, Inc. (MSF), attempted to collect on behalf of various creditors.
1 27
MSF was in the business of collecting dishonored checks, for which it would
corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant
stockholder, absence of corporate records, and the corporation functioning as a mere facade
for operations of the dominant shareholders. Id. at 685-87.
118. Id. at 688.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 689.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., In re County Green Limited Partnership, 604 F.2d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 1979);
West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 585 (W.D. Va. 1983).
123. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 684. That actual fraud is neither necessary, nor alone sufficient,
to pierce the corporate veil has long been the law in the Fourth Circuit, and in Virginia. See,
e.g., Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1983); Hamilton Ridge
Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 1928); Puamier v. Barge BT 1793,
395 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1974).
124. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 687.
125. 558 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Va. 1983).
126. Id. at 569 (quoting S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1695).
127. Id. at 571.
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receive between thirty and fifty percent of the amount of the check collected
for its client.' 28
The consumer plaintiffs named as defendants not only MSF, but also Wil-
liam C. Costen, its president and primary shareholder, and several of its
officers and employees.' 29 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged
in a series of practices which violated the FDCPA.130 The court found vir-
tually all of plaintiffs' claims to be meritorious, but had some trouble sorting
out the liability of the individual defendants. The court imposed personal
liability for statutory violations on the individual debt collectors (other than
Costen, who didn't have direct contact with consumers) and, under a vicari-
ous liability theory, on MSF. 13 ' Because there was no allegation that Costen
violated any provisions of the Act himself, the court held that Costen could
be held personally liable only by piercing the corporate veil of MSF.' 32
In considering whether to disregard the corporate entity of MSF, the Cos-
ten court cited DeWitt as establishing the law on piercing the corporate veil
in the Fourth Circuit.' 33 The court declared that "[a] corporate entity gen-
erally will be recognized as a separate entity, functioning through its officers
and directors, to which its creditors must look for satisfaction of debts and
obligations incurred in the corporate name."1 34 The court cautioned, how-
ever, that the corporate structure was not "a shield for dominant sharehold-
ers to hide behind while defrauding or injuring creditors, or conducting
illegal operations.' ' " Citing De Witt, the court concluded that "when sub-
stantial ownership of all the stock of a corporation in a single individual is
combined with other factors clearly supporting disregard of the corporate
fiction on grounds of fundamental equity and fairness .... the corporate
entity will be disregarded and liability fastened on the individual
128. Id. at 571-72.
129. Id. at 569.
130. Id. at 572. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the MSF group violated the FDCPA
by:
(1) communicating with third parties concerning the collection of debts ...
(2) threatening that criminal prosecution was pending or that warrants were to be
issued when such was not intended and could not be done legally ... ; (3) failing to
comply with the notice and validation of debt procedures required [by the FDCPA];
(4) collecting service charges not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the
debt or permitted by law ... ; and (5) misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed
and the legality of receiving service charges as compensation for collecting debts.
Id.
131. Id. at 573.
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shareholder."1 3 6
Turning to the facts before it, the court noted that MSF was formed as a
Pennsylvania corporation in 1974 with only 500 shares of common stock at
$2.00 par value, for a total authorized capital of $1,000.00.137 Aside from its
$1,000.00 capital base, MSF had few assets beyond office equipment and
furniture. 3 ' MSF maintained no reserves for contingencies, and a
$15,000.00 loan from a bank was obtained on the personal signatures of Cos-
ten and another officer rather than on the credit of MSF. 3 9 The court ob-
served that "MSF, like any debt collection agency, faced prospective
liabilities under the FDCPA because claims thereunder are a predictable risk
of a collection business, even for an agency that attempts to comply" with
the FDCPA.14 Moreover, MSF's potential loss for even a single claim was
statutory damages of up to $1,000.00 plus actual damages and attorney's
fees. "Patently," the court concluded, "MSF's woefully inadequate capitali-
zation would barely cover even a single individual statutory penalty at the
maximum level, much less a number of claims or a class claim. Thus, the
uncontested facts show that MSF was grossly undercapitalized to operate as
a collection agency."'
' 41
The court noted that in addition to being undercapitalized, MSF had
never paid a shareholder's dividend, despite the fact that MSF paid Costen
substantial sums of money in the form of commissions for obtaining new
accounts for collection.' 42 It was unclear from the Costen opinion whether
MSF had properly authorized the distribution of earnings to Costen in the
form of salary.
The court conceded that MSF had apparently maintained "at least a sem-
blance of corporate records, including minutes of shareholders' and direc-
136. Id. (footnotes omitted).
137. It.
138. Id. at 586.
139. Id.
140. d
141. Id. The court held that undercapitalization was a proper ground for piercing the
corporate veil because it is "the policy of the law that shareholders should in good faith put at
the risk of the business unencumbered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective liabili-
ties." Id. (citing H. BALLANTINE, supra note 4, at 302-03).
142. Id. The court reasoned as follows:
That Costen was siphoning the funds of the corporation is illustrated by putting
Costen's compensation in perspective with MSF earnings during the same period.
MSF suffered a net loss during 1976-1978 and its net gain in 1979 was only $282. By
comparison, Costen's remuneration during these years amounted to $2,567 in 1976,
$6,184 in 1977, $15,428 in 1978, and $17,325 in 1979.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Leventhal v. Army-Navy Realty, Inc., Chancery No. 20,364
(Cir. Ct. of Arl. County) (June 18, 1971).
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tors' meetings." '14 3 Despite the presence of corporate housekeeping, howver,
the court found that Costen considered MSF to be his own personal business
vehicle. The court considered it significant that Costen's mother ran MSF's
office in Norfolk, Virginia, and when asked her job description, answered
that "she helps her son."' 44 Costen secured'personal loans from MSF with-
out the approval or vote of the MSF Board of Directors. 145 Nor did MSF
ever obtain a business license from the city of Roanoke, Virginia. 4 6 The
court concluded that Costen's disregard for the interests of MSF also was
demonstrated by his failure to comply with the record keeping requirements
of state law.'
47
The court went on to hold, however, that perhaps the most important
reason to disregard MSF's corporate form and impose personal liability on
Costen was that "it would be unfair to the plaintiffs and contrary to the
purpose of the FDCPA to uphold MSF's corporate facade."' 48 The court
reasoned that MSF was liable to the plaintiffs for "blatantly illegal collection
practices. '49 The undisputed facts, the court found, compelled the conclu-
sion that Costen himself knew or should have known of the MSF violations
of FDCPA.'5 ° He was, after all, at all times MSF's president and main-
tained his office on the corporate premises. The court concluded, therefore,
that Costen had "misused the corporate form" and that justice required that
MSF's corporate form be disregarded and that personal liability be imposed
upon Costen."'
2 Differential Treatment
Virginia courts appear to afford a greater deference to affiliated corpora-
tions than to close corporations, perhaps reflecting the result in DeWitt,
143. Costen, 588 F. Supp. at 586.







151. Id. En route to this holding, the court considered the argument that the consumers at
all times knew that MSF was incorporated. The court handled the issue as follows:
Although the consumers from whom MSF attempted to collect debts cannot claim
that they have been unduly influenced by the corporate front, a judgment creditor,
including a victim of a statutory illegality, can be as effectively defrauded as a con-
tractual creditor and is equally allowed to pierce the corporate veil in the appropriate
situation. Indeed, a victim of a statutory illegality or tort may be more entitled to
pierce an undercapitalized corporation because, unlike a contractual creditor, the
former's dealings with the corporation are involuntary and uninformed.
Id. at 586 (citations omitted).
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where the veil of a closely held corporation was pierced. Similarly, the Cos-
ten court imposed liability on the majority shareholder of a closely held cor-
poration in part because the undisputed facts revealed that Costen
considered MSF to be "his own personal business vehicle."1 52 Indeed, the
Virginia case law is replete with suggestions that the courts should look
somewhat suspiciously on the close or one-person corporation. In Puamier
v. Barge BT 1793, 153 for example, the court stated:
[W]hile there is no law against it, we are suspicious of the fact that
Zapetis was the sole or primary stockholder in numerous corpora-
tions. It appears that, while each corporation may have had some
legitimate business dealings, Zapetis brought them into play as
shields for his personal dealings. This is clearly improper.'54
A Virginia court's strongest language directed at the closely held corpora-
tion appeared in a 1966 decision in Lewis Trucking Corp. v.
Commonwealth: '
55
In the case of the one-man corporation or the corporation in which
all stock is owned by a single individual except a few shares neces-
sary to qualify directors, courts have shown great liberality in lift-
ing the veil of the corporate entity and holding the sole shareholder
and the corporation to be one and the same.'
56
Despite their strict scrutiny of close corporations, Virginia courts have
proven more protective in the parent-subsidiary context. Brown v. Mar-
grande Compania Naviera "' involved an attempt to hold the parent corpo-
ration liable for salvage services in towing and saving a tanker chartered by
one subsidiary carrying another subsidiary's cargo. Texaco, the parent,
owned all the stock of the two subsidiaries and the corporations had inter-
locking directors and officers.'
5 8
Noting that "[i]ndiscriminate application [of the piercing doctrine] would
destroy the purpose of the corporate law,"' 59 the court refused to pierce the
152. Id.
153. 395 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Va. 1974).
154. Id. at 1039 (citations omitted).
155. 207 Va. 23, 147 S.E,2d 747 (1966) (Delaware corporation was sham corporation set
up by Virginia resident for purpose of avoiding payment of Virginia license taxes.).
156. Id. at 32, 147 S.E.2d at 753-54 (quoting 4 MIcH. JUR. CORPORATIONS § 5, at 559
(1983)).
157. 281 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1968).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1006. The court further stated:
The extent of stock ownership and potential control possessed by a holding company
is not the determining factor when its liability for acts and obligations of the subsidi-
ary are in question. Something more is needed, such as fraud, illegality, or wrongdo-
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veil of the subsidiaries on the ground that no unfairness would result."6 In
order to disregard the corporate facade, the court stated, "[i]t must appear it
was organized for a fraudulent purpose or that some injury has resulted to
someone from the transaction, something of fraud, something of illegality or
wrongdoing, or something where the moving party has cause for complaint
in connection with the transaction."1 61 Clearly the court placed greater im-
portance on preserving Texaco's carefully constructed shields to liability,
choosing to regard the lack of compensation for salvage services as no cause
for complaint.
162
The court was equally protective of the parent-subsidiary relationship in
In re Nova Real Estate Investment Trust 163 despite seemingly damning facts.
The court found common officers and directors and common offices between
parent and subsidiary.' 6 The corporations transacted business for each
other, and the parent had controlling influence over the subsidiary.' 65 Yet
these facts were, in the view of the court, insufficient to find the subsidiary
the instrumentality of the parent.166 "More must be shown, e.g., that one
corporation is a mere agency, instrumentality, tool or adjunct of the other,"
the court remarked.' 67 The same general guidelines of DeWitt and other
cases provide for little consistency in outcome. It is clearly more difficult in
Virginia than in its neighboring jurisdictions to grasp the state's piercing
doctrine.
D. The Source of Liability: Tort, Contract, and Evasion of Statute
A final means of comparing the three jurisdictions discussed above pro-
ceeds along thematic lines; namely, the importance of the source of liability
in determining whether the corporate entity should be disregarded.
1. Tort Versus Contract
For several decades, legal scholars and commentators have argued that
the corporate veil should be pierced more readily in tort than in contract
cases. Because a contract is consensual in nature, a party has a prior oppor-





162. Id. at 1007.
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tunity to investigate its contracting partner before it enters into the agree-
ment. It is therefore argued that a party assumes the risks of contracting
with an undercapitalized or otherwise improper corporation, and should not
be entitled to pierce the corporate veil if the corporation is later unable to
meet its obligations. In the case of closely held corporations, the party con-
tracting has a prior opportunity to ask for personal guarantees from the
shareholder or shareholders. Disregard of the corporation in contract cases,
these commentators argue, should therefore be limited to situations in which
the injured party relied to its detriment on misrepresentations or efforts to
mislead on the part of the contracting corporation. 6 '
In tort cases, on the other hand, the corporation and the injured party are
typically strangers, such that the victim has had no prior opportunity to
investigate. In such instances, the two-prong test often appears unjustly
harsh. The tort victim's likelihood of piercing the corporate veil is depen-
dent on whether the corporation had observed corporate formalities, a fortu-
itous circumstance ordinarily unrelated to the tort itself.'69 Despite the
general trend in tort law towards compensating the victim, the victim of a
tort committed by an insolvent corporation is often unlikely to be compen-
sated for the wrong suffered. Instead, the victim involuntarily absorbs the
loss, becoming an unwitting subsidizer for the corporation's activities. 7 '
Despite extensive scholarship on the issue, however, most courts have
failed to distinguish between tort and contract in deciding whether to disre-
gard the corporate entity. Typically, shareholders are not held liable for a
168. Arguably, contract creditors who were reasonably able to protect themselves should
be denied access to shareholders' personal assets since the interest of preserving the corporate
form and the expectation of limited shareholder liability can be said to outweigh any unfair-
ness to an injured party that freely contracted. The focal point, in many commentators' views,
should be the ability of the contracting party to protect itself:
Arguably, the court should assume that the parties to the transaction voluntarily
distributed the risks between themselves in negotiating the contract terms. In effect,
this approach modifies the two prong test for contract cases, requiring plaintiffs to
show not only unfairness and disregard of corporate formalities but also that plain-
tiffs did not assume the risk by going ahead with the transaction.
Barber, supra note 9, at 384-85; see also Gelb, supra note 34, at 10-13; Gillespie, supra note 29,
at 390.
169. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 9, at 381-83.
170. See Comment, supra note 27, at 136-37 (discussing limited liability as a subsidy to
insolvent corporate tortfeasors). Argues one commentator, "[i]t is difficult to see how mere
commingling of affairs and failure to observe corporate formalities prejudice a third party,
especially a tort creditor who is totally unaware of the situation at the time the cause of action
arises." Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1122, 1126 (1958); see also Note, supra note 7, at 1190 (advocating a separate test for torts).
Singled out as particularly unjust by some commentators are tort cases in which the defendant
corporation was closely held, and shareholders were actively involved in the corporation's
policies and operations.
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corporation's torts, nor for its contract obligations, except where corporate
formalities have not been observed and where grave injustice would
result. 171
The Virginia courts have been the only courts of the three contiguous
jurisdictions to consider the long-argued position of commentators that a
distinction between tort and contract is warranted in piercing cases. In Cos-
ten, the court in dicta explicitly discussed such a distinction, stating "a vic-
tim of a statutory illegality or tort may be more entitled to pierce an
undercapitalized corporation because, unlike a contractual creditor, the for-
mer's dealings with the corporation are involuntary and uninformed.
' t72
Courts in the jurisdictions adjoining Virginia, however, have stood
the tort/contract distinction on its head: the consistent outcome
of decisions both in Maryland 73  and the District of Col-
171. See H. HENN, supra note 4, §§ 143, 146.
172. West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 586 (W.D. Va. 1983) (emphasis added). Since the
1983 decision, however, no piercing case has relied upon this suggested distinction. Nor have
courts in the state discussed such a distinction in contract cases. Costen, by combining a tort,
the evasion of statute, and a closely held corporation, may have simply presented an isolated
and compelling case to disregard the corporate entity. Id. at 584-87.
In contrast to the Maryland position, Virginia courts have looked into the contractual rela-
tionship and have demonstrated a willingness to interfere when misrepresentations have been
made. In Puamier, the court found that misrepresentations made to the contracting party by
Zapetis, the sole stockholder, justified piercing the corporate veil and imposing personal liabil-
ity. Neither the existence of a binding contract, nor the assertion that any misrepresentations
were made in good faith dissuaded the court from disregarding the corporation. Puamier v.
Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019, 1038-39 (E.D. Va. 1974). This approach sharply conflicted
with that of the Maryland court in Colandrea, which permitted piercing the veil only after
being satisfied that the necessary element of scienter had been proven by the plaintiff. Colan-
drea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 426-27, 401 A.2d 480, 484 (1979). The Puamier court stated:
If good faith were to become a defense in actions of this type, every defendant would
claim good faith of some sort even though he did exactly what he intended to do in
misrepresenting certain facts to an innocent party. This is not an action for common
law misrepresentation in which scienter must be proven. That distinction must be
made. The corporate identity can be pierced to prevent not only fraud, but any
injustice.
Puamier, 395 F. Supp. at 1039.
173. The court's decision in Dixon suggests that Maryland law is consistent with legal
commentary concerning piercing the corporate veil in contract cases. In actuality, Dixon is
simply indicative of the general protectiveness exhibited by Maryland courts toward the corpo-
rate entity. The Dixon court distinguished the case of Bethlehem Steel v. Raymond Concrete
Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 118 A. 279 (1922), relying on the "instrumentality" rule rather than the
tortious conduct at issue in Bethlehem Steel. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 652,
382 A.2d 893, 898 (1978). Moreover, the Bethlehem Steel court, in suggesting that a tort case
may be less likely to result in piercing the corporate veil in Maryland than a contract case,
took a position diametrically opposed to the views of commentators. Bethlehem Steel, 141 Md.
at 81-82, 118 A. at 284. In Bethlehem Steel, the court refused to pierce the veil of the subsidi-
ary to recover from Bethlehem Steel because no fraud or paramount equity was demonstrated,
although the separate existence of the subsidiary was suspect. Id. at 81, 118 A. at 284. Be-
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umbia'7 4 has been to prefer the contract plaintiff to the tort plaintiff in disre-
garding the corporate form.
2. Evasion of Statute
Courts in all three capital region jurisdictions have shown less reluctance
to disregard the corporate form where a corporation has been used to evade
a statute or to circumvent legislative policy. The state's interest in uphold-
ing its law is generally a concern paramount to the preservation of the corpo-
ration in an isolated case."' Although the Maryland law concerning
evasion of a statute in piercing cases is sparse, it suggests that the courts do
not require a showing of fraud in such cases to disregard the corporation.' 76
In cases involving evasion of statute or legislative intent, Virginia courts
have readily pierced the corporate veil,' 77 often to prevent the corporate
cause actual fraud seems easier to demonstrate, and more likely to occur in an ongoing rela-
tionship such as that of contracting parties, the tort victim, a likely stranger to the corporation
prior to the accident, bears a heavier burden to pierce the corporate veil.
174. In Labadie, the court blatantly flaunted the position espoused by most commentators
that "a person dealing with a corporation in a contract setting is expected to have had the
opportunity to investigate the corporation with which it deals, and essentially to have assumed
the risk that the corporation may prove unable to meet its financial obligations." Labadie Coal
Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Noting that most courts have failed to adopt
this view, the Labadie court quoted another commentator in stating that "[i]f the prior oppor-
tunity to investigate is a consideration, then the plaintiff's lack of sophistication is equally
tenable against the presumption that they knowingly assumed the risk of the corporation's
undercapitalization." Id. (quoting Barber, supra note 9, at 386). In Labadie, however, the
plaintiff was another corporation, presumably endowed with sophistication sufficient to oper-
ate its business.
Similarly, in Schattner v. Girard, 668 F.2d 1366, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court pierced
the corporate veil and allowed recovery on the contract, although no fraud or wrongdoing was
alleged "with the requisite particularity." The court noted that "Schattner is not to be rescued
from a poor bargain, of course, but it may not be presumed on this record that Schattner
bargained with a clear understanding of the distinction between [the individual] and [the cor-
poration]." Id. at 1370 n.4.
The District of Columbia courts do not single out tort cases for separate treatment, perhaps
due to the courts' general willingness to pierce the corporate veil. In Vuitch, however, a medi-
cal malpractice case, the court chose to emphasize the equitable nature of the piercing doctrine
rather than the tort context in disregarding the corporate entity. Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d
811, 816 (D.C. 1984) (quoting W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 41.30).
175. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1245.
176. Dixon can be distinguished from Maryland Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Al-
brecht, 183 Md. 87, 36 A.2d 666 (Md. 1944), on the basis that Albrecht involved evasion of a
statute and, thus, required no proof of fraud to pierce. Dixon, 38 Md. App. 644, 656-58, 382
A.2d at 893, 900-01 (1978).
177. See, e.g., West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 584-85 (W.D. Va. 1983), discussed supra
notes 125-51 and accompanying text. In United States v. Hudgins-Dize, 83 F. Supp. 593, 597-
98 (E.D. Va. 1949), the court held that an individual who attempted to use the corporate entity
to evade the requirements of the Walsh-Healey Act may be held personally responsible for
violating them. The court remarked that "Itihe interposition of corporate form has never been
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form from denying relief to creditors of a bankrupt.17 Similarly, District of
Columbia courts have demonstrated a readiness to disregard the corporation




As noted at the outset, the decisions of any state bearing on the issue of
piercing the corporate veil are neither coherent nor susceptible of pat gener-
alizations. Based on the cases discussed above, however, it may be permissi-
ble to advance the following conclusions.
1. District of Columbia
The law of the District of Columbia can be characterized as recognizing
only a qualified doctrine of limited liability. In the District of Columbia,
unlike in Maryland or Virginia, a disregard of corporate formalities, without
more, may constitute prima facie evidence of unfairness or inequity. The
permitted to thwart the action of law upon a wrongdoer. The courts will tear away the corpo-
rate veil whenever it is used 'to evade a statute or modify its intent.' " Id. at 598 (quoting
Nettles v. Rhett, 94 F.2d 42, 48 (4th Cir. 1938)). Similarly, in Lewis Trucking Corp. v. Com-
monwealth, 207 Va. 23, 147 S.E.2d 747 (1966), the court, finding that Lewis created the corpo-
ration in order to avoid Virginia license plate fees, stated "[iut is well settled that such a
corporate transfer cannot be used as a method of nullifying established policies of law." Id. at
31, 147 S.E.2d at 753.
178. The threshold in Virginia for piercing the corporate veil in bankruptcy cases appears
to be lower than for most other circumstances. See, e.g., Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 288-89
(4th Cir. 1942) (where Virginia store incorporated separately from Delaware parent, but all
corporate activity performed by parent, the Virginia corporation would be disregarded and
creditors of bankrupt parent allowed to reach assets of the subsidiary); Hamilton Ridge Lum-
ber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592, 595-96 (4th Cir. 1928) (corporation set up by creditor
bank and bankrupt lumber corporation to secure debt to bank was not bona fide and would be
pierced). But see In re County Green Ltd. Partnership, 604 F.2d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 1979)
(refusing to pierce corporate veil).
179. "Courts have not hesitated to ignore the fiction of separateness and approve a piercing
of the corporate veil when the corporate device frustrates the clear intendment of the law," the
court remarked in Valley Finance Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
"The government's inability otherwise to satisfy legitimate tax debts clearly may form a sound
basis for such disregard of corporate form." Id. Similarly, in Vuitch, the court commented
that "[c]ourts will not allow the interposition of a corporation to defeat a legislative policy."
Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 819 (D.C. 1984); see also Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 759
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("[w]e have admonished that 'the fiction of a corporate entity cannot stand athwart sound
regulatory practice' ")); Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FCC
validly exercised its discretion in piercing veil of corporate applicant for high-band radio-pag-
ing channel and treating the corporate applicant and its individual owner as one applicant).
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practical effect of this merging of the two prongs of the traditional test is to
lower the showing a plaintiff must make in order to pierce the corporate veil.
Even if disregard of corporate formalities is not enough to satisfy the unfair-
ness test in the District of Columbia, something less than fraud will suffice,
perhaps a finding that the corporation was formed solely to limit liability.
Finally, in the District of Columbia, as in its neighboring jurisdictions, a
corporation quickly will be stripped of its limited liability where doing other-
wise would evade a statute or circumvent legislative policy.
Consequently, any entity incorporated under the laws of the District of
Columbia which disregards corporate formalities exposes its shareholders to
a substantial risk of personal liability. To neglect the proper corporate
housekeeping in the District of Columbia is to gamble with the very limited
liability one sought to obtain by incorporating.1
8 0
2. Maryland
The law of Maryland with respect to disregarding the corporate entity can
be characterized as inordinately protective of limited liability for sharehold-
ers. The Maryland courts have offered investors and their counsel a bright-
line test: even in the absence of corporate formalities, the corporate veil will
be pierced only in instances of proven common law fraud or evasion of a
statute. One court aptly described piercing the corporate veil of a Maryland
180. By lowering the threshold to piercing the corporate veil, the District of Columbia
courts presumably seek to protect consumers and improve their bargaining position with cor-
porations. From an economic standpoint, however, increasing the frequency with which the
corporate veil is pierced in the District of Columbia creates incentives to the corporation, some
of which work against the desired goal.
The current standard discourages businesses from either incorporating or doing business in
the District of Columbia. Sloppy record keeping or complaints from creditors seem sufficient
grounds for disregarding a corporation, despite good faith efforts on its part to comply.
Although the stringent standards might screen out "shady" or marginal corporations, it seems
likely that the net effect will be to reduce economic activity in the area.
On the other hand, the clear standard in the District of Columbia facilitates business by
reducing uncertainty. Uncertainty raises the cost of business by forcing parties to estimate
their obligations and act on expected probabilities. Under a clear standard, as in the District
of Columbia, parties know their legal obligations with a high degree of certainty and are free to
shift the burdens by contract, like imposing insurance costs, for example, on the noncorporate
party. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). However, at least one
complication arises. Individuals seeking to start a corporation will face extra costs in contrac-
tually altering the assignment of liability and risk. The negotiations cost time and money and
there may be some uncertainty over the ability of the parties to limit the shareholders' liability
by contract. These costs will deter investors from starting the business in the first place.
The increased exposure to personal liability will reduce the return on capital in the District
of Columbia. Individual consumers will benefit from the greater likelihood that they will be
able to collect damages for any liability incurred by corporations. They will suffer, however,
from a general decline in economic activity.
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corporation as "a herculean task."'' While counsel should never advise his
or her client to disregard corporate formalities, the crux of a challenge to the
corporate veil in Maryland is proof of fraud or evasion of a statute.
The strict Maryland policy of protecting the corporate entity may appear
attractive to a business wishing to incorporate, and with some justification.
Shareholders of a Maryland corporation can reasonably rely on the expecta-
tion that their limited liability will be upheld, even in a situation that would
be borderline in another state. The overall effect is to spur substantial invest-
ment and long term planning on the basis of such a relatively secure and
certain business environment.
From a practical standpoint, however, investors considering organization
of their business under Maryland law should recognize that Maryland's
fierce protection of limited liability also may be appealing to corporations
that operate in a marginal or suspicious manner, perhaps borderline bank-
rupt, undercapitalized, or mismanaged companies. A situation of moral
hazard may result: precisely the kinds of businesses that are likely to incur
liability may incorporate in Maryland to escape legal obligations.'
2
3. Virginia
Virginia, through its "totality of the circumstances" approach, perhaps
best utilizes the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as its equity roots
intended: as a discretionary device employed in highly exceptional circum-
stances. While something less than actual fraud must be shown, under De-
Witt the determination in any particular matter will turn on a number of
factors.'83 As a consequence of this approach, however, in Virginia it is
harder to predict the outcome of a challenge to the corporate veil than in
181. Dixon v. Process Corp., 38 Md. App. 644, 645-46, 382 A.2d 893, 894-95 (1978) (dis-
cussed supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text).
182. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1264-65. From an economic standpoint, the relative
lack of concern shown by the Maryland courts for corporate formalities further increases the
uncertainties of doing business with Maryland corporations. To the extent that corporate for-
malities serve a notice function by facilitating identification of a legitimate corporate entity,
Maryland corporations and businesses may provide less information than their counterparts in
other states. Because a failure to comply with corporate formalities does not increase a corpo-
ration's likelihood of being pierced by a court in Maryland, corporations arguably are given
little incentive to invest the efforts necessary to meet formality requirements.
The Maryland courts' failure to concern themselves with corporate formalities avoids the
inequities of some jurisdictions where adherence to such formalities allows a corporation to
protect itself from tort liability, although the formalities are likely irrelevant in an accident
occuring between strangers.
183. Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685-87 (4th
Cir. 1976).
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either Maryland or the District of Columbia. 184
Nonetheless, it can be argued that, of the three jurisdictions, Virginia
alone may be more likely to disregard the corporate form to compensate a
tort victim. Like their neighbors, Virginia courts are unlikely to permit an
entity to evade a statute by use of the corporate form. On the other hand,
the Virginia courts consistently have protected subsidiary activities, even in
the face of injustice. A corporation in Virginia, as in Maryland, may find it
safer to undertake a new and potentially risky activity by engaging in it
through a subsidiary. The opposite appears to hold true in the District of
Columbia.185
B. Choice of Law
The foregoing discussion suggests that the outcome of a challenge to the
corporate entity may vary considerably depending on what state's laws are
brought to bear on that challenge. Predicting what state's law will apply to
any given corporation, however, may not always be a simple matter. Just
because a corporation has been organized under the laws of a particular state
does not mean that all courts will apply the laws of that state to a challenge
to the corporate entity.
184. From an economic standpoint, the greatest disadvantage to incorporating in Virginia
is uncertainty. Corporations have little understanding as to where the line is drawn between
appropriate and inappropriate conduct; similar facts have produced different results before
Virginia courts, and how much joint activity between affiliated corporations, for example, is
considered "unity of interest" varies from case to case.
The risk of such uncertainty is that corporations will behave in a conservative manner in
order to minimize the risk that a court would disregard their corporate form. This in turn may
result in a less than optimal level of corporate activity, possibly leading to an unnecessarily
poor economic and social climate.
185. This suggests a court-fashioned policy preference in Virginia for larger, established
corporations and their subsidiaries over smaller, newer businesses. Arguably, those attracted
to incorporate in Virginia will likely be one of two types. The first type will be large corporate
subsidiaries with a greater disdain for safety and honest conduct, knowing Virginia courts will
generally protect their limited liability. This amounts to a judgment call in Virginia that the
economic benefits from such activity will outweigh the loss to individual members of the com-
munity or other corporations doing business with these subsidiaries. Yet in such a case one
would expect the victims of that activity to be compensated for having borne a disproportion-
ate loss in order to encourage a general economic and social gain.
The second type of business attracted to incorporate in Virginia is one that feels it has
nothing to fear from a doctrine of ensuring justice in the individual case. Such a business
should be well managed and should operate in accordance with the law. This is precisely the
type of corporation that offers the greatest social benefit to the community. The cost of at-
tracting these kinds of businesses is simply that they will not be risk-takers, technology-seek-
ers, or venture firms. Apparently, Virginia has decided that a less than optimal level of
economic activity due to its uncertainty in piercing decisions is a sacrifice it is willing to make
for the corresponding gains in social welfare.
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In Labadie, for example, the defendant FAI was incorporated under the
laws of Virginia, but was sued in the District of Columbia.' 86 The District
of Columbia circuit, without addressing the choice of law issue, reviewed
precedent from both jurisdictions but declined to follow the approach in De-
Witt in favor of the approach traditionally adopted by District of Columbia
courts.' 87 Similarly, the corporate defendant in Costen was a Pennsylvania
corporation licensed to do business in Virginia. 88 The Virginia court ap-
plied Virginia law and the Dewitt approach in disregarding MSF's corporate
form. 1
89
The promoters of a new venture may not, therefore, assume that they need
only comply with the level of corporate formalities required by the state of
incorporation. Unless an entity conducts a business which is so localized so
as to subject it to suit only within its state of incorporation, it may be re-
quired to meet the standards of a neighboring jurisdiction. State courts may
or may not apply their conflict of laws principles to determine whether the
law of the forum state or of some other state should apply. Where a corpo-
ration has registered to do business in the state where suit is brought, the
courts of that state, rightly or wrongly, may assume that the entity intended
to subject itself to the laws of that state.
While federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are more likely to ad-
dress the choice of law issue, they may either apply the law of the forum or
follow other federal cases.19° Similarly, courts asserting federal question ju-
risdiction may, like the Fourth Circuit in DeWitt, 191 elect to fashion a fed-
eral common law by picking and choosing precedents from a number of
jurisdictions.
This unpredictability provides little comfort to the venturers who seek to
influence the strength of their corporate form through the selection of a ju-
risdiction in which to incorporate. Some solace may be found in the ten-
dency of venue provisions to protect defendants from suits in jurisdictions
other than where they reside, do business, or where the cause of action arose.
Moreover, a defendant corporation may move for a transfer of venue on
grounds of forum non conveniens or, in federal court, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Still, investors and their counsel are best served by a working
assumption that their corporate veil may be judged by the standards of any
186. 672 F.2d 92, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
187. Id. at 96-99.
188. 558 F. Supp. 564, 571 (W.D. Va. 1983).
189. Id. at 584-87.
190. See United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 85-87 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Comment,
supra note 28, at 1248.
191. 540 F.2d 681, 683-87 (4th Cir. 1976).
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jurisdiction in which personal jurisdiction may properly be asserted over the
corporation and its shareholders.192
C. Corporate Formalities
Thus, regardless of the state of incorporation, investors and their counsel
would be well advised to observe routine corporate formalities. It is a small
price to pay for limited liability, yet, to varying degrees, it may well deter-
mine the outcome of a challenge to the corporate form. Especially in the
District of Columbia, where the absence of corporate formalities is itself
sometimes viewed as indicative of corporate fraud or wrongdoing, the share-
holders of corporations who choose not to maintain proper corporate house-
keeping are, simply put, at risk. Even in Maryland, which stands at the
other end of the three-jurisdiction spectrum, and where the absence of cor-
porate formalities will not lead to disregard of the corporate entity absent
actual fraud or evasion of statute, no court appears to have addressed the
issue whether fraud alone will justify shareholder liability where corporate
formalities were assiduously maintained.
Those courts that have engaged in a detailed review of the corporate for-
malities maintained by a corporate defendant have proceeded along the lines
of traditional corporate law. Regarding the initial organization of the ven-
ture, courts have expected to see articles of incorporation, bylaws, organiza-
tional meeting minutes, stock certificates, and proper capitalization.
Once the venture has been established, courts have looked for minutes of
annual shareholder meetings to elect directors, followed each year by a meet-
ing of the directors to elect officers and to transact other business. Special
attention has been paid to the extent to which the corporation has acted
through its board of directors, as evidenced by resolutions passed and re-
corded in minutes, and the extent to which principals of the company signed
checks, notes, and documents on behalf of the corporation in their capacities
as president, treasurer, and the like.
In addition to records of shareholder and director action, courts have fo-
cused on the records reflecting the revenues and expenses of the corporation.
Personal and corporate funds must not be commingled. Earnings must be
taken out of the corporation in the form of dividends or through salaries
properly authorized by the directors. Indeed, the Labadie court looked sus-
piciously on the fact that the defendant corporation never declared a divi-
dend, despite substantial earnings.
It deserves noting that the courts have not fastened upon the occasional
192. For a discussion of conflict-of-laws and jurisdictional questions, see Note, supra note
8, at 853.
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deficiency in corporate formalities as grounds for disregarding the corporate
veil. Yet there does appear to be an expectation that corporations will en-
deavor to observe the proper formalities on an ongoing basis, and a certain
level of consistency appears to be required in order to avoid judicial
suspicion.
D. Choice of Forum
As noted above, the promoters of any venture cannot be assured that the
integrity of their corporate form will be measured against the law of the state
in which they elect to incorporate. The unpredictability of the courts in this
regard undermines any justification for selecting a home state based on that
state's law with respect to piercing the corporate veil. At most, the extent of
any jurisdiction's protection of limited liability should be but one of many
factors considered in selecting a home state. 193
In fact, the three-jurisdiction comparison set forth herein may be of
greater use to a plaintiff than to a corporate defendant. That is, while a
corporation may not be able to predict under which law its corporate form
may be challenged, advance knowledge of a jurisdictional attitude toward
piercing the corporate veil (to the extent a coherent attitude can be dis-
cerned) will probably influence the choice of forum by any plaintiff who is
considering the need to disregard the defendant's corporate form. A plain-
tiff's ability to select his or her forum only underscores the importance of
maintaining corporate formalities sufficient to pass muster in any jurisdic-
tion that may assert personal jurisdiction over the corporation and its
shareholders.
IV. CONCLUSION
De Tocqueville portrayed American business as thriving on the thrill of
risk and chance:
Those who live in the midst of democratic fluctuations have always
before their eyes the image of chance; and they end by liking all
undertakings in which chance plays a part. They are therefore all
led to engage in commerce, not only for the sake of the profit it
holds out to them, but for the love of the constant excitement occa-
sioned by that pursuit.
194
193. Other factors include tax bases and rates, minimum capitalization requirements, limi-
tations on the numbers of directors, provisions relating to the personal liability of directors and
officers, restrictions on the payment of dividends, restrictions on the location of meetings of
shareholders or directors, costs of organization, and annual filing fees. See generally G.
SEWARD & W. NAUSS, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE (2d ed. 1977).
194. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 165 (A. Knopf ed. 1945).
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Yet business activity more accurately thrives, and encourages investment
from a variety of sources, where the associated risk is carefully controlled.
Limited liability serves such a purpose for the American corporate enter-
prise. Well counseled investors will understand that, especially in closely
held corporations, it is incumbent upon them to safeguard their limited lia-
bility by maintaining the fiction, and thereby the integrity, of the corporate
form.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil serves as a safety valve-an
important exception to limited liability in particularly egregious circum-
stances. As the discussion herein has demonstrated, how egregious the cir-
cumstances must be varies significantly among the three jurisdictions in the
capital region. Prudent corporate shareholders will know how the doctrine
is applied and will run their businesses accordingly.

